I. INTRODUCTION
Key establishment is basic tool for secure communication in networks, two nodes in networks can have agreed shared key that is only known to them, thus allowing the shared key for protecting their communications. In many environment there is significant advantage to non-interactive key agreement schemes which need not to use any communication between nodes. The Diffie-Hellman type key agreement protocol(see [1] ) is non-interactive, but some known public keys are needed which is a impractical for large networks. Recently key agreement using key predistribution schemes have been presented for very large networks such as, hierarchical networks and wireless sensor networks( [12] , [7] , [17] , [11] , [13] , [2] ).
The key predistribution scheme(KPS) was proposed by R.Blom in Eurocrypt 84 ( [3] ). It was extended by C. Blundo et al in Crypto 92 [4] . This cryptographic primitive has been a basic ingredient in the security of wireless sensor Hao Chen is with the Software Engineering Institute, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062, China. EMAIL: haochen@sei.ecnu.edu.cn networks(see [10] , [11] ) and hierarchical systems(see [17] , [13] ). However in the Blom and Blundo et al KPS, the size of the finite field in the KPS has to be larger than the number of users. The unique form of Blom-Blundo et al KPS has no flexibility in practical application. These are real drawbacks.
In a HIERARCHICAL networks with n nodes, the root authority only needs to distribute the secret information to a small number of large organizations or group leaders, and then each of these can further distribute the secret information to smaller and smaller units(see [17] , [13] ). In this way we can think the nodes are arranged on a tree, the root of tree distributes the secret information of its children nodes and then each of these distributes secret information to its children nodes... each node only get its secret information from its parent node. Finally the leaf nodes get their secret information from their parent nodes. Each pair of nodes at the same level (including the leaf nodes and internal nodes) can compute their shared key by the secret information and the identities of themselves and their parents. This would help for group level authentication and confidentiality in the whole hierarchical network. The expansion number U is the maximal number of children nodes.
In the application such as tactical networks, mobile ad-hoc networks, it is more reasonable to assume a Hierarchical network structure than a central trusted authority (see [17] , [18] , [13] ). On the other hand, the using of Hierarchical network structure can reduce the workload of of the TAs. The Hierarchical identity based encryption (HIBE) was studied in [16] , [14] , [5] . In [6] , HIBE was used for the construction of forward secure encryption. The hierarchical key agreement has been studied in [17] , [13] .
In previous constructed key agreement schemes in [17] and [13] , every node in the hierarchical network needs the storage of (ti+1)(ti+2) 2 elements of the base field for resisting the compromising of t i nodes at i-th level of the hierarchical networks. It will grows exponentially when the number of levels in the hierarchical network tends to the infinity. The KAS in [13] can only resist the attack of compromising arbitrary many leaf nodes. The security of KAS in [13] was proved with the random oracle model. The identity based key agreement scheme of [13] is dynamic, nodes can be added at each level of the hierarchy without changing the information of other nodes.
In this paper we construct generalized Blom-Blundo et al key predistribution schemes and key predistribution schemes from a family of hyperelliptic curves. New random polynomials are introduced in the functions computing shared keys in these generalized Blom-Blundo et al key predistribution schemes. Hyerelliptic curve KPSs are constructed from different random curves. These new randomness and flexibility of our key predistribution schemes can be used to construct strongly resilient key predistribution schemes for hierarchical networks with low storage, communication and computation cost. The size of the base field of our new key predistribution schemes depends only on the expansion number U of the hierarchical network and the storage of every node is O(A K U ), where A K is the number of nodes at K-th level of the hierarchical network. Moreover the constructed hierarchical network key predistribution schemes are dynamic and non-interactive. Our key predistribution schemes for hierarchical networks can resist the compromising of arbitrary many of nodes with very low storage at every node.
II. BLOM-BLUNDO ET AL KPS
Now we recall the definition of KPS by following the presentation in the paper of Stinson [19] . Suppose we have a Trusted Authority (TA) and a set of users U = {1, ..., n}. Let 2 U be the set of all subsets of the user set U. P ⊂ 2 U will denote the collection of all privileged subsets to which the TA is distributing keys. F will denote the collection of all possible coalitions(forbidden subsets) against which each key is remain secure. In the Key Predistribution Scheme, at the set up stage, each user i get its secret information u i from the TA, where u i is taken in a finite dimensional linear space over GF (q). Once the secret information u i , i = 1, ..., n , is given to each user, in the computation stage, for any privileged subset T ∈ P, the users in the privileged subset T can compute the shared key k T ∈ GF (q) for their communications. No forbidden subset J ∈ F disjoint from T can get any information of the key k T . This is called (P, F)-KPS. When P consists of all subsets of U with t elements and F consists of subsets with at most w elements, we call it t-variable and w-secure KPS. Thus a t-variable and w-secure KPS can be used to get the shared keys of any subset with t users, which is secure against the attack of any w users.
Generally the KPS is required information theoretically secure against the attack of the coalition of users, for the more formal presentation we refer to [3] , [4] , [19] .
The secret information u i , i = 1, ..., n, is in the finite dimensional linear space over the finite field GF (q) h , where q is a prime power. Thus the storage is hlog 2 (q) bits. The shared key k T , for each privileged subset T ∈ P, is in GF (q). In the computation stage, each user i in T computes k T from its secret information u i and the IDs of other users in the set T . Only the arithmetic in GF (q) is involved. We call GF (q) the base field of the KPS.
The first KPS proposed in [3] is a 2-variable and w-secure KPS, and it was generalized in [4] to a tvariable and w-secure KPS. Let q be a prime power satisfying q ≥ n. Each user i is assigned to an element e i ∈ GF (q) as its identity. The TA takes a random t variable symmetric polynomial in
.., i t } is an arbitrary permutation of {1, ..., t}). This polynomial is only known to the TA. The symmetric (t − 1) polynomial f (e i , x 2 , ..., x t ) is given to the user i, i = 1, ..., n, as its secret information. For any privileged subset T = {e i1 , ..., e it }, each user in this subset T can compute the shared key k T = f (e i1 , ..., e it ).
In the case t = 2, this is just the KPS in [3] . The bit length of secret information stored by each user in Blom-Blundo et al KPS is
III. GENERALIZED BLOM-BLUNDO ET AL KEY PREDISTRIBUTION SCHEMES
In this section we present the generalized 2-variable and w-secure Blom-Blundo et al KPS, which can be extended easily to t-variable and w-secure KPS.
Let GF (q) be a fixed finite field, there are at least
which is not zero at any element in GF (q).
, where f (x) is a degree w polynomial. Because P (x) = 0 for any x ∈ GF (q), thus u(x) is defined for any x ∈ GF (q). Let u 1 = f1 P , ..., u w+1 = fw+1 P , where f 1 , ..., f w+1 is a base of the linear space of all polynomials in GF (q)[x] with degree less than or equal to w, be a base of the linear space of all these functions, for example
Suppose H ≥ w the 2-variable and w-secure KPS associated with P (x) on the set of q users defined over GF (q) can be constructed as follows. The elements in GF (q) are assigned to the users as their IDs. The TA takes a random
The function F (P = e i , Q), as a function of Q, where e i ∈ GF (q), can be given to the user e i as its secret information. The shared key of the users with IDs e i and e j is F (P = e i , Q = e j ). The bit length of the secret information stored by each user is (H + w + 2)log 2 (q).
Here (H + 1)log 2 q bits are used to store the polynomial P (x). Theorem 1. Suppose H ≥ w the above KPS is w-secure.
Proof. We take the matrix of w + 1 rows and q columns with the entry at i row and j column is u i (x j ), where x j is the j-th element in GF (q). This is actually a rank w + 1 matrix. Actually any linear combination of w + 1 rows v 1 , ..., v w+1 of this matrix can not be zero at more than w positions, since the function c 1 u 1 + · · · + c w+1 u w+1 = c1f1+···+cw+1fw+1 P cannot have more than w zero points. Then the w-security of the above KPS follows from the same argument as in [1] .
The functions in the generalized Blom-Blundo et al KPSs have poles at the extension fields of GF (q). If the polynomials P 's are distinct, these poles are distinct elements in the extension fields. Thus it is impossible for these functions in KP S(P random )'s have an monic polynomial relation. That is, it is impossible to express the symmetric function used in one generalized Blom Blundo et al KPS as the polynomials of symmetric functions of other different generalized Blom Blundo et al KPSs.
The t-variable version of the generalized Bom-Blundo et al KPSs will not be used in the hierarchical network key predistribution schemes given in section V. We include the construction here for the convenience of the readers. The t-variable and w-secure generalized Blom-Blundo et al KPS associated with P (x) on the set of q users defined over GF (q) can be constructed as follows. The elements in GF (q) are assigned to the users as their IDs. The TA takes a random
where a i1···it are symmetric about its subindices (then F is symmetric about its variables) where P 1 , ..., P t ∈ GF (q). The t − 1 variable function F (P = x, P 2 , ..., P t ) can be given to the user with ID = x as its secret information. The shared key of the t users with IDs e 1 , ..., e t is F (e 1 , ..., e t ). The bit length of the secret information stored by each user is t + w − 1 t − 1 log 2 (q) + (H + 1)log 2 q. Here (H + 1)log 2 q bits are used for the storage of the polynomial P (x).
The proof of the w-security of this t-variable KPS is directly since any w + 1 columns of the matrix in Theorem 1 are linearly independent.
Then how many different such KPSs can we have? We know there are at least B H = Σ t|H (
H t polynomials P (x) from the above argument corresponding to at least B such KPSs. When w is a prime number B H = q H −q H . This is quite large when both q and H satisfying q > H tends to the infinity. Thus there are sufficiently such different KP S(P )'s for the randomness we need in the design of KPS for the wireless sensor networks. Generally this number can be computed by zeta functions associated with the rational curve(see [16] ).
When f 1 = 1, ..., f w+1 = x w in the above generalized 2-variable and w-secure KPS, we have the shared key is computed by the function Σ w i=0,j=0 , a ij
. There are at
in the computation of the shared keys. Hence the shared keys can be adjusted by these polynomials. So the randomness we needed in the design of KPS comes from these polynomials P ∈ GF (q) [x] .
How can we use these irreducible polynomials in the implementation of the generalized Blom-Blundo et 
We can have a 2-variable and 3-secure KP S(p) on the set of 9 players by taking random function
, where a ij = a ji are random elements in GF (9).
Example 2. Let p(x)
. This is an irreducible polynomial in GF (2)[x]. It is easy to check p(x) is also irreducible in GF (2 11 )[x], otherwise the intersection of GF (128) and GF (2 11 ) is bigger than GF (2). If 7h ≤ 2 11 = 2048, the functions
p(x) h can be used to get a 2-variable and 7h-secure generalized Blom-Blundo et al KPS. The setup server takes a random symmetric function
h where a ij = a ji are random elements in GF (2 11 ). The setup server then predistributes F (e i , y) to the sensor node with ID = e ∈ GF (2 11 ) as its secret information. The shared key of two sensor nodes with IDs e, e ′ ∈ GF (2 10 ) is F (e, e ′ ). This generalized Blom-Blundo KPS can be used for at most 2 11 = 1024 sensor nodes. Since 7 is a prime number The generalized Blom-Blundo et al key predistribution schemes can be used for disigning strongly resilient wireless sensor networks KPSs(see [8] ).
IV. RANDOM KEY PREDISTRIBUTION SCHEMES FROM HYPERELLIPTIC CURVES

A. Key predistribution schemes from a family of hyperelliptic curves
Let q be an odd prime power, X a be the hyperelliptic curve y 2 = x q + q + a defined over GF (q 2 ), where a ∈ GF (q) is an arbitrary element in GF (q) ⊂ GF (q 2 ). The genus of this curve is q−1 2 (see [14] ). For each x ∈ GF (q 2 ), x q + x = T r GF (q 2 )/GF (q) (x) is an element in GF (q). Thus x q + x + a ∈ GF (q). It is easy to show that each element in GF (q) ⊂ GF (q 2 ) is a square element, thus we have 2q 2 affine GF (q 2 ) rational points on X a , and one GF (q 2 ) rational point Q at the infinity. x has a 2-th pole at the point Q and y has a q-th pole at the infinity. Let L(uQ) be the linear space of rational functions on the hyperelliptic curve with only pole at the point Q and the pole order not bigger than u. It is known that {x i y j |2i + qj ≤ u}, under the reduction y 2 = x q + x + a, is a base of the function space L(uQ) if u ≥ 2g − 1 = q − 2, which is a u − g + 1 dimensional space over GF (q). For example when u = 2q, then {1, x, ..., x q+1 2 , y, yx, ..., yx q−1 2 } is a base of L((2q)Q)(see [14] ).
Suppose q ≥ 5. We have a key predistribution scheme over GF (q 2 ) on the set of 2q 2 users, the TA can take X a for a random a ∈ GF (q) and a random function
Here a ij is symmetric about i and j, f 1 , ..., f w+ h2 . Then F (P 1 = W, P 2 ) ∈ L((w + q − 1)Q) is given to the user with the ID = W as its secret information. For the users with ID = W and ID = W ′ , the shared key between them is F (W, W ′ ) ∈ GF (q 2 ). It is clear that in this (2, w) KPS over GF (q 2 ) on the set of 2q 2 users the storage of secret information of each user is 2(w + q−1 2 )log 2 (q) bits.
Theorem 2.
The above key predistribution scheme is w-secure.
Proof. We consider the (w + q+1
2 ) × (2q 2 ) matrix by evaluating the w + q+1 2 base functions of L((w + q − 1)Q) at the 2q 2 points described as above. This is actually the generator matrix of the algebraic geometric code(see [14] ). It is well-known the minimum Hamming distance of the dual code is at least w +2(see [14] ). Thus any w +1 columns of the above matrix are linear independent vectors in GF (q 2 ) w+ q+1 2 . From the construction of Blom key predistribution scheme in [1] (also see [11] pages 236-237), the above construction is a w-secure key predistribution scheme on 2q 2 users.
In this family of key predistribution schemes KP S(a) on the set of 2q 2 users, where a is the parameter of curve equation, the shared keys are computed in a field with q 2 elements. The randomness of of these KPSs are from random curves instead of polynomials in the generalized Blom KPSs.
Though we need not to use the t-variable case in section V for the key predistribution schemes of hierarchical networks the construction is included here for the convenience of the readers. The above 2-variable and w-secure KPS can be extended to t-variable and w-secure KPS as follows. the TA can take X a for a random a ∈ GF (q) and a random function Here a i1...it = a j1..jt , where  j 1 ...j t is an arbitrary permutation of i 1 ...i t , and f 1 
is a base of L((w + q − 1)Q) of the form x h 1 y h2 . Then F (P i1 = W, P i2 , ..., P it ) of t − 1 variables is given to the user with the ID = W as its secret information. For the users with ID 1 = W 1 , ..., ID t = W t , the shared key for them is
. It can be proved similarly as above that this t-variable and w-secure KPS over GF (q 2 ) on the set of 2q 2 users. The storage of secret information of each user
and the proof will be included in our future paper [9] .
B. Implementation
In the key predistribution schemes from hyperelliptic curve X a where a can take any element in GF (q), the TA can assign the coordinates of the GF (q) rational points of the hyperelliptic curve X a , a ∈ GF (q) to the 2q 2 users as their IDs. Then the TA can fix a base of the function space L((w + q − 1)Q) as above. The process of these key predistribution schemes is the same as in Blom KPS, the only difference is the polynomials and the elements of the finite field are replaced by rational functions in L((w +q −1)Q) and GF (q 2 ) rational points of the curve. It should be noted that the same monimial base as above can be used for arbitrary curve X a , a ∈ GF (q), in the process of the computation of the shared keys, the reduction used on the curve X a is y 2 = x q + x + a. The parameter a playes the critical role in the computation of shared keys in the hyperelliptic curve key preditribution schemes. Here (w + q+1 2 )log 2 (q) bits of secret information need to be stored by each user.
V. STRONGLY RESILIENT KEY PREDISTRIBUTION SCHEMES FOR HIERARCHICAL NETWORKS
Let R be the root authority, it has at most A 1 children nodes
is number of all nodes at the 3rd level. We assume the hierarchical system has L + 1 levels. The node at the K level is denoted by R i1i2..iK−1 , which has A (i1i2...iK−1) children nodes. Here i j is its number at the j-th level. Let A K = ΣA (i1i2...ıK−1) is the number of all nodes at the K + 1-th level. We assume A (i1...iK ) ≤ U for any possible subindices, that is, for each node, it has at most U children nodes. U is called the expansion number.
A. Generalized Blom-Blundo et al key predistribution schemes for hierarchical networks
We fix a prime power q ≥ 2U and a positive integer t such that
≥ q and 2U − 1 = th for some positive integer h. We consider the q irreducible polynomials of degree t P 1 , ..., P q ∈ GF (q)[x] and a one-to-one correspondence between P α1 , ..., P αq and the elements α 1 , ..., α q of GF (q) will be used. For any parent node R i1...iK−2 at the K − 1-th level, each child node R i1...iK−2j at the K level is assigned an element in GF (q) as its ID. There are at least (
curve-KPS on the set of 2U users defined over GF (q). The KPS associated with the polynomial P h αi is denoted by KP S(P αi )
The root authority R uses the random KP S(P s ), where s is a random element in GF (q), to give the secret information to each of its child node R i , where i ≤ A 1 . The bit length of the secret information is 2(U − 1)log 2 (q). For each node R i at the 2nd level, R i randomly picks up KP S(P si ), where s i ∈ GF (q) is random element in GF (q), to give each of its child node the secret information. For any two R i1j1 and R i2j2 at the 3rd level, R i1 and R i2 at the 2nd level can have a shared key s i1i2 in GF (q) from the KP S(P s ), then R i1 and R i2 use KP S(P si 1 i 2 ) to give secret information to their children nodes R i1j 's and R i2j 's. When R ij1 and R ij2 want to find their shared key, they can use KP S(P si , and when R i1j1 and R i2j2 want to find their shared key, they can use KP S(P si 1 i 2 ). This process can proceed to all the levels. That is, R i1...iw randomly picks up KP S(P si 1 ...iw ) for the shared key among its children nodes, and R i1...iw and R i ′ The bit length stored in each node at the K + 1-th level is 2A K (2U − 1)log 2 (q) and the computation of the shared key is mainly the (2U − 1) times of multiplications of the finite field GF (q).
B. Hyperelliptic curve key predistribution schemes for hierarchical networks
We denote the generalized (2, 2U − 2) curve-KPS on the set of 2U ≤ 2q 2 users defined over GF (q 2 ) from the hyperellptic curve X : y 2 = x q + x + a as in section 3.1 as KP S(a) with parameter a from the finite field GF (q). We take a finite field GF (q 2 ) satisfying 2U ≤ 2q 2 . The root authority R uses the random KP S(a), that is a is randomly picked up from the finite field GF (q), to give the secret information to each of its child node R i . The bit length of the secret information is 2(2U + q−3 2 )log 2 (q 2 ). For each node R i at the 2nd level, R i randomly picks up KP S(P ai ), where a i ∈ GF (q), to give each of its child node the secret information. For any two R i1j1 and R i2j2 at the 3rd level, R i1 and R i2 at the 2nd level can have a shared key s i1i2 in GF (q 2 ) from the KP S(a), then R i1
and R i2 use KP S(P s q+1 i 1 i 2 ), to give secret information to their children nodes R i1j 's and R i2j 's. It should be noted s q+1 i1i2 ∈ GF (q) since s i1i2 ∈ GF (q 2 ). When R ij1 and R ij2 want to find their shared key, they can use KP S(P ai , and when R i1j1 and R i2j2 want to find their shared key, they can use KP S(P s
). This process can proceed to all the levels.
That is, R i1...iw randomly picks up KP S(P si 1 ...iw ) , where s i1...iw ∈ GF (q), for the shared key among its children nodes. The nodes R i1...iw and R i ′ The field size in this hyperelliptic curve-KAS for the hierarchical system has to satisfy q 2 ≥ U 2 , which is much weaker than the previous KAS.
The bit length of the secret information stored in each node at the K + 1-th level is 2A K (2U + q−3
2 )log 2 (q 2 ) and at most 4U + q − 3 times of multiplications of the field GF (q 2 ) are used for computing the shared key.
C. Key predistribution schemes for dynamic hierarchical networks
In the above hierarchical KAS, when q ≥ 2A (i1...iK−1) is valid in genus 0 KPS and q 2 ≥ A (i1...iK−1) in hyperelliptic curve KPS, nodes can be added by the parent node R i1...iK−1 to the hierarchy. That is, if we choose q with suitable large size, the hierarchical nodes can added by the parent node without change the settings of other nodes.
VI. INFORMATION THEORETICAL SECURITY
Because the number of children nodes of each node A (i1i2...iK ) ≤ U and we use (2, 2U − 2) KPS, the adversary compromising less than 2U nodes cannot get the full information of the KPS used, if the adversary compromise all children nodes (at the K + 1-th level) of the nodes R i1...iK−1 and R i ′ and themselves can be deleted without any impact on the key agreement scheme of the other nodes, since we use the RANDOM KPS associated with random polynomials or from random curves for the key predistribution for the un-compromised nodes and their children nodes. The point here is, after deleting the compromising nodes, their children nodes and their parent nodes, the secret information stored in un-compromised nodes is random and the shared keys of the un-compromised nodes are uniformly distrubited random variables from the view of the compromised nodes.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper the generalized Blom-Blundo eta la key predistribution schemes and key predistribution schemes from hyperelliptic curves have been constructed. This kind of KPSs is flexible and can be used to construct hierarchical network key predistribution schemes. The size of shared keys only depends on the expansion numbers of nodes. These hierarchical network KPSs are identity based and dynamic. They are more efficient than the previously known hierarchical key agreement schemes and information theoretical secure against the compromising of arbitrary many internal and leaf nodes. The storage of each node is linear about the number of nodes at each level.
